This paper explores a new account of ontological dependence based on exact truthmaker semantics, which I call the truthmaking account. The account holds that states verifying existential propositions and the parthood relation between states can characterize the relation of ontological dependence. After presenting the truthmaking account, I compare it with the modal and grounding accounts. In particular, I show that the truthmaking account is better than the modal one, and I explore its advantages and disadvantages with respect to the grounding account.

Material Plenitude is the view that, for every material object, there exists a myriad of objects coinciding with it that differ only in which properties they have essentially and which they have accidentally. Metaphysicians have formulated several versions of Material Plenitude, relying primarily on modal characterizations of essences and accidents. In this paper, I first motivate the need for a version of Material Plenitude that is compatible with a Finean understanding of essential and accidental properties, and then develop such a view, Finean Plenitude. Along the way, I highlight its most significant features.

I present evidence against the view that certain sociolinguistic variants lead audiences to be more likely to successfully interpret an utterance when it is produced by a speaker belonging to privileged social groups. The experiments I designed and executed yield results that falsify this view. I conclude the paper by exploring the implications of the experimental findings for uptake failure and the broader theoretical debate about discursive injustice. In particular, I suggest that social personae, the constellation of character traits one aims to project through language, instead of group membership, are sometimes the source of uptake failure.