I am currently a third-year PhD Student in Philosophy at Syracuse University. Before completing my BA (2020) and MA (2022) in Philosophy at the University of Italian Switzerland, I grew up in Gaeta, Italy. My full CV is here.
I focus on metaphysics and the philosophy of language. In metaphysics, I am interested in ontological dependence, grounding, modality, and properties. In the philosophy of language, my interest concerns linguistic vagueness, the nature of propositions, and subject matter. I am also particularly fascinated by understanding whether the social identities of a speaker influence the content of an utterance. Finally, I have a project at the intersection of metaphysics and the philosophy of language that concerns the application of truthmaker semantics in both disciplines.
You can find my recent talks and information about my teaching performance as a TA below. My email is anantoni@syr.edu.
Recent Talks:
- “The Truthmaking Account of Ontological Dependence”
Ontological Dependence, Grounding and their Applications, Padova, 27 May 2024 (Online). Abstract. Slides.
This talk explores a new account of ontological dependence in terms of exact truthmaking semantics, which I call the truthmaking account. The account holds that states verifying existential propositions and the parthood relation between states can characterize the notion of ontological dependence. After presenting the truthmaking account, I compare it with the modal and grounding accounts. In particular, I show that the truthmaking account is better than the modal one and I explore its (dis)advantages with respect to the grounding account.
- “Essential Plenitude”
Eastern APA, NYC, 18 January 2024. Abstract. Handout.
After Fine's Essence and Modality (1994), several metaphysicians reject accounts of essential properties in purely modal terms, and, as a result, there is a philosophical tradition born on those ashes that spells out the notion of the essence in terms of objects' identity. I propose to give an account of Material Plentitude---every material object coincides with an abundance of other objects---in terms of Finean essence. If my attempt is successful, metaphysicians who have Plenitudinist tendencies but reject an analysis of essence in purely modal terms while preferring the Finean account of essence can finally participate in the debate without giving up their core beliefs about essentiality.
Teaching: