Antonio Freiles

Publications Works in Progress Talks Teaching

anantoni@syr.edu & CV

Antonio Freiles

I am a PhD Candidate in Philosophy at Syracuse University, where I have also earned an MA in Linguistics. My research lies in metaphysics and the philosophy of language, and I am drawn to the questions that emerge where these areas intersect with social philosophy. Before coming to Syracuse, I completed my BA and MA in Philosophy at the University of Italian Switzerland, and I grew up in Gaeta, Italy.

My dissertation explores the tensions that arise between our understanding of our own social identities, on the one hand, and influential views in metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and normative ethics, on the other. I demonstrate how theories in social ontology and speech act theory are constrained by our everyday conceptions of our place in the social world, especially when it comes to accommodating the intuitions that social identities define who we are and affect how successfully we communicate. I then examine the normative powers exercised by social identities, and argue that a proper metaphysical theory of social identities can pair with certain anti-aggregative ethical theories to explain how duties to the self and others arise.

Early in my graduate studies, I researched whether truthmaker semantics could help inform the notions of ontological dependence and grounding. This work resulted in my first publication, in which I formulate an account of ontological dependence in terms of truthmaker semantics.

Publications

The Truthmaking Account of Ontological Dependence. Forthcoming in Erkenntnis. (Pre-print)
Abstract

This paper explores a new account of ontological dependence based on exact truthmaker semantics, which I call the truthmaking account. The account holds that states verifying existential propositions and the parthood relation between states can characterize the relation of ontological dependence. After presenting the truthmaking account, I compare it with the modal and grounding accounts. In particular, I show that the truthmaking account is better than the modal one, and I explore its advantages and disadvantages with respect to the grounding account.

Papers

Under Review

A paper formulating a version of Material Plenitude based on a hyperintensional notion of essence.
A paper raising some general issues for accounts of grounding formulated with the tools of truthmaker semantics.
A paper investigating whether successful uptake of illocutionary acts varies depending on the social identity of the speaker.

In Progress

A paper defending the view that certain types of identities generate duties to self and others.
A paper contending that Material Plenitude's applications to social ontology are unsatisfactory.
A paper arguing that the standard model of language can account for the inferences that sociolinguistic variants trigger.

Recent Talks

"Material Plenitude for Fineans"
2026 UT-Austin Graduate Philosophy Conference, ATX, February 27 - 28, 2026.
Abstract

Material Plenitude is the view that, for every material object, there exists a myriad of objects coinciding with it that differ only in which properties they have essentially and which they have accidentally. Metaphysicians have formulated several versions of Material Plenitude, relying primarily on modal characterizations of essences and accidents. In this paper, I first motivate the need for a version of Material Plenitude that is compatible with a Finean understanding of essential and accidental properties, and then develop such a view, Finean Plenitude. Along the way, I highlight its most significant features.
"Does Who Speaks Matter?"
FAX5 (Poster), Lake Forest College, March 20 - 21, 2026.
Abstract • Handout

I present evidence against the view that certain sociolinguistic variants lead audiences to be more likely to successfully interpret an utterance when it is produced by a speaker belonging to privileged social groups. The experiments I designed and executed yield results that falsify this view. I conclude the paper by exploring the implications of the experimental findings for uptake failure and the broader theoretical debate about discursive injustice.

Teaching

PHI 107: Theories of Knowledge & Reality. Spring 2026. Primary Instructor: Syllabus.
PHI 192: Introduction to Moral Theory. Fall 2025. Primary Instructor: Syllabus & Evaluations.
PHI 191: The Meaning of Life. Online Asynchronous, Summer 2025. Primary Instructor: Syllabus.